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This paper investigates a possible impact of education corruption on economic growth in
Russia. It argues that high levels of education corruption may harm total factor produc-
tivity in the long run, primarily through lowering the level of human capital and slowing
down the pace of its accumulation. Ethical standards learned in the process of training in
universities can also affect the standards of practice in different professions. The growing
level of economic productivity is not likely to reduce education corruption in the short run,
but can eventually lead to implementation of higher ethical standards in the education
sector.
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The question of the impact of education corruption on
economic growth remains in the realm of speculations and
some theorizing. There is a lot of research done on human
capital, education, economic development, and growth.
There is also a substantial bloc of literature on corruption
and economic development and growth. This bloc of
scholarly literature, however, is represented mostly by
theoretical works. Few empirical works have been
produced so far, primarily due to the lack of data. Reliability
and validity of the existing scarce data on governance and
corruption also remain as an issue. In this paper, we target
education corruption, human capital, and growth in Russia.
More speciﬁcally, we look at corruption in education and at
its possible implications for economic growth in Russia. We
consider speciﬁc aspects of education corruption and their
probable impact on growth. These aspects include inter-
actions between education corruption and total factor
productivity and interactions between corruption and the
structure of the national economy.
Education corruption may be harmful for productivity
while higher productivity may reduce education corrup-
tion. Education corruptionmay to a certain extent deﬁne orangUniversity. ProducedanddistributedbyElsevier Limited.All rights reserved.
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in the education sector may be reduced through changes in
the economic structure. All of these are mere speculations
or hypotheses to be researched rather than deﬁnitive
statements. The areas to be touched upon are the education
sector, labor market, level of concentration of property
rights, and distribution of property rights on the means of
production. This paper starts with a general overview of the
nexus between corruption and economic growth. It then
presents speciﬁc issues of education corruption in Russia.
These two sections form the informative base for the
discussion section, in which we consider possible impact of
education corruption on economic growth. In conclusion,
we offer some policy recommendations in the context of
economic transition.
2. Corruption and economic growth
Corruption is a growing problem in Russia and receives
more attention now than ever before. According to some
estimates, transition economies are believed to be among
the leaders in terms of corruption. The surveys conducted
by Transparency International and by the World Bank
picture Russia as a very corrupt country. According to the
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), developed and calcu-
lated annually by Transparency International, Russia was
79th out of 91 countries surveyed in 2001. In 2010, Russia
was in 154th place, with the score of 2.2, out of 178 coun-
tries, sharing the neighborhood with such countries as
Cameroon and Zimbabwe (Transparency International,
2010). CPI scores relate to perceptions of the degree of
corruption as seen by business people and country analysts,
and range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
The lower the numerical value of the country’s score, the
higher the level of corruption in the country.
The All-Russian Center for Research of Public Opinion
(VCIOM) conducted a study of corruption perceptions
among Russians at the end of 2008. 30 percent of the
respondents marked the level of corruption as very high,
while another 44 percent as high. 19 percent considered it
as average and only 1 percent as low. The most corrupt in
people’s minds are trafﬁc police (33 percent), local
authorities (28 percent), police (26 percent), healthcare (16
percent), and education (15 percent). 52 percent of the
respondents had experiences of giving money or gifts to
medical professionals, while 36 percent made informal
payments to educators (Leonidov, 2009). According to the
data, presented by the Attorney General, major categories
of corrupt civil servants in Russia are members of college
and university faculty, school teachers, policemen, and
doctors, but not state bureaucrats.
The number of corrupt civil servants does not correlate
directly with their total number or the level of a region’s
economic development. The number of reported cases of
corruption in Russia continues to grow. There were 12,500
cases of bribery reported in 2008. That is a 7.7 percent
increase as compared to 2007. The number of recorded
abuses of public ofﬁce in 2008 has reached 43,500, i.e. an
11.4 percent increase since 2007. The number of bribes in
business, however, has declined 23.8 percent, down to 1712
cases. Police investigators presented courts with 27.4percent fewer cases of corruption in 2008, than they did in
2007. For investigators in the prosecutor’s department this
decline is equal to 4.5 percent in overall cases (Newsru.com,
May 5, 2009). Despite all the claims of the authorities on
the uncompromising ﬁght against corruption, the real
numbers show opposite trends.
Over 80 percent of all of those sentenced for bribery
received less than $1000 each in illicit payments. Only 189
court sentences were handed in 2008 to bureaucrats of all
levels, including federal, regional, and municipal level
bureaucrats. These categories of bureaucrats are prose-
cuted for bribe receiving. The majority of those prosecuted
for bribe giving consists of drivers. They routinely pay
bribes to the trafﬁc police ofﬁcers. However, when the
police ofﬁcers are under watch by their own controllers,
they may arrest a driver for the offer of a bribe and send
him/her to court. Such a statistic is very surprising since
one would expect businessmen to constitute the bulk of
those who pay bribes and, under the effective anti-
corruption campaign, are prosecuted for bribe giving.
Apparently, this is not the case. The chair of the non-
governmental organization against corruption, Kirill
Kabanov, says that the government only catches those
corrupt civil servants who are easy to catch. He also
believes that more than half of all the court cases against
corrupt civil servants are a result of mere provocation.
Street level civil servants are a major target for anti-
corruption campaigns, but not even street level bureau-
crats (Kornya, Holmogorova, & Nikol’skij, 2009).
Rose-Ackerman (1978) considers corruption as an
“allocative mechanism” for scarce resources. The state
monopolizes certain allocation functions, be it permissions
and licenses, or access to public services. State ofﬁcials’
proﬁteering is based on abuse of their discretionary powers
and monopolistic positions. Referring to Klitgaard (1988, p.
23) Gong states that corruption: “occurs when an agent
betrays the principal’s interests in pursuit of his/her own or
when the client corrupts the agent ‘if he or she (client)
perceives that the likely net beneﬁts from doing so
outweigh the likely net costs’” (Gong, 2002, p. 88).
According to the “grease-the-wheels” concept of corrup-
tion, it helps overcome bureaucratic obstacles that remain
from the previous regime. This may be especially true for
Russia during the transition period of the 1990s. There are
some methodologies that allow approaching the issue of
corruption and measuring it (see, for instance, Bellver &
Kaufmann, 2005; Besançon, 2003; Kaufmann & Kraay,
2003; Osipian, 2007a, 2009c), including legalistic
(Kaufmann & Vicente, 2005; Zimring & Johnson, 2005),
quantitative (Heyneman, Anderson, & Nuraliyeva, 2008),
and economic ones (Kaufmann, Hellman, Jones, &
Schankerman, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999).
Lancaster and Montinola (1997) suggest that studies of
corruption should assess rival explanations.
Svensson (2005) notes that it might be true that higher
wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption, but there is not
enough evidence to support it (pp. 32–33). According to the
data analysis, presented by Shleifer and Treisman (2003,
pp. 27–28), administrative corruption is very high in the
poor countries of the former Soviet Union, such as Uzbe-
kistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, lower in the Russian
Table 1
Business-related corruption in CIS and CEE, 2002.a
Country Indicator Country Indicator Country Indicator
Armenia 13.5 Hungary 8.8 Russia 13.7
Azerbaijan 19.5 Kazakhstan 14.2 Serbia 16.3
Belarus 17.9 Kyrgyz
Republic
31.4 Slovak
Republic
27.5
Bulgaria 25.4 Latvia 11.7 Slovenia 6.1
Croatia 22.5 Lithuania 15.6 Tajikistan 21.0
Czech
Republic
12.5 Moldova 40.2 Ukraine 27.8
Estonia 5.4 Poland 27.6 Uzbekistan 8.7
Georgia 35.1 Romania 34.9
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in
August 10, 2006. Cited from Osipian (2009f, p. 112).
a Data for Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Poland, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
are for 2003.
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relatively wealthy Hungary and Slovenia. Individuals’
perceptions about corruption put Russia lower than
Argentina, Brazil, Romania, or Lithuania. Svensson (2005)
notes that, “All of the countries with the highest levels of
corruption are developing or transition countries. Strik-
ingly, many are governed, or have recently been governed,
by socialist governments” (p. 24). Referring to the works of
Lipset (1960), Demsetz (1967), and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Schleifer (2004), the author points out that
higher per capita income and higher levels of human
capital reduce corruption.
The Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation is
composing a list of most “corruptible” public ofﬁces, ﬁrst of
all those with high discretionary authorities over big funds
and projects. These ofﬁces will be taken under special
control. The Minister of Justice, Aleksandr Konovalov,
emphasizes transparency and accountability. He also
suggests new organizational technologies and electronic
decision-making (Savel’eva, 2008). Russian Prime Minister,
Vladimir Putin, signed the order “On the methodology of
conducting an expert examination of the projects of laws
and other legal documents with the goal of identifying
sections and regulations that have a potential to facilitate
corruption” (Putin, 2009). Despite governmental efforts, 58
percent of Russians think that it is impossible to annihilate
corruption. The major causes of corruption are thought to
be greediness and low moral standards (44 percent of the
respondents) and ineffective government and legislation
(34 percent of the respondents). Only 18 percent of
Russians see themselves as the cause of corruption due to
their low legal culture and legal nihilism (Newsru.com,
April 28, 2009).
The Minister of The Interior, Rashid Nurgaliev, uses
some very vague estimates, based on surveys and other
small scale sociological studies, to report the annual
damage from corruption on a scale of 40 billion rubles, or
around $1.5 billion. This sum is not that large for a country
with an annual GDP of around $2.2 trillion, as measured in
the nominal USD. Over 56 percent of businessmen reported
paying bribes to state bureaucrats. According to the
representative survey, conducted by the New Russia
Barometer in 2007, 86 percent of Russians believe that the
police itself are all corrupt from top to bottom, even though
only 5 percent of the respondents acknowledged facing
corruption in police (Samofalova, 2008).
The National Anticorruption Committee estimates the
total corruption market at $300 billion. 40–60 percent of
this total consists of kickbacks paid by businesses to public
bureaucrats in exchange for governmental contracts and
concessions (Newsru.com, March 17, 2009). The numbers
are impressive, but the sources and credibility of such
estimates are not clear. Russian President Dmitry Medve-
dev took on corruption seriously: bureaucrats who hide
their incomes should be ﬁred immediately (Newsru.com,
March 10, 2009). However, Russians are not very inter-
ested in their public ofﬁcials’ incomes, as indicated by 52
percent of the respondents (Newsru.com, April 14, 2009).
People are not interested in the income declarations of
particular bureaucrats, but 50 percent approve the idea of
their publication. 26 percent think that bureaucrats will beable to get around the reporting of their income, while 15
percent consider such measures as political populism on
the part of the government (Nikol’skij, 2009).
Quantitatively, corruption remains a black box. No one
knowswhat share of all the corrupt activities are covered in
the ofﬁcial statistics. An increase in the number of prose-
cuted corrupt civil servants may indicate a success in the
anti-corruption campaign or an increase of the total
number of corrupt civil servants involved in illicit activities.
The obverse is truewith the decrease in these numbers. The
level of sentenced corrupt civil servants is not a good
indicator for any measure of corruption or anti-corruption.
The police themselves found 25 percent fewer corrupt
ofﬁcers among its people in 2008, compared to 2007. The
Attorney General does not believe that this decline indi-
cates higher standards of integrity in the police. Rather, it
results from the less active work by the Internal Security
Department in the police (Newsru.com, May 5, 2009).
One of the arguments used to support the idea of sharp
and signiﬁcant output decline in the countries of the
former Soviet Bloc is that the high level of corruption in
transition economies has a negative impact on production
and productivity. Wewill turn to statistical data to test such
a statement. The level of business-related corruption in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 2002 is presented in Table 1.
The percent of managers who consider corruption the
major obstacle for the business and entrepreneurial activ-
ities is considered an indicator of the negative impact of
corruption on production. The data was obtained during
the survey conducted in the NIS and CEE in 2003.
According to the data presented in Table 1, the level of
corruption in business and the relationship between busi-
ness and state in Russia is at the lower end of the scale for
the region overall. Moldova is a leader in corruption, while
in Estonia, Slovenia, and Hungary the level of corruption is
relatively low as compared to the region’s average. Need-
less to say, data on corruption are always to a large extent
subjective, partial, and oftentimes biased. Nevertheless,
these data should be taken into considerationwhen there is
a lack of better sources of information.
The issue of whether slowing economic growth results
from an increase in corruption is still open.While a positive
correlation between the high level of corruption and
output decline has been proven theoretically with the help
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evidence has yet to be shown. In the short run, corruption
in transition economies may act as both grease for the
“rusty” and rigid bureaucratic mechanism or an additional
transaction cost for businessmen and entrepreneurs.
Correlation of the GDP per capita growth and estimates of
corruption made by the businessmen in the NIS and CEE
countries of the former socialist bloc in 2002 is presented
as a diagram in Fig. 1.
The diagram shows that there is no clear evidence of
a positive correlation between the level of corruption and
output decline or GDP growth slowdown. In Moldova GDP
per capita growth of 8 percent in 2002 was possible with
the level of corruption marked at 40.2. In Slovenia during
the same year GDP per capita growth was only 3 percent,
with the level of corruption at 6.1. In Russia, GDP per capita
growth of around 5 percent in 2002 coexisted with the
level of corruption of 13.7, while in Ukraine the same level
of GDP per capita growth related to a corruption level of
27.5 on the offered scale.
3. Education corruption in Russia
The deﬁnition of education corruption includes the
abuse of authority for material gain (Anechiarico & Jacobs,
1995a, 1995b). Sayed and Bruce (1998) andWaite and Allen
(2003) present a broad social approach to deﬁne corrup-
tion. Petrov and Temple (2004) apply a narrow deﬁnition of
corruption that regards corruption as such only if it implies
illegality. Corruption in higher education may be deﬁned as
a system of informal relations established to regulate
unsanctioned access to material and non-material assets
through abuse of the ofﬁce of public or corporate trust
(Osipian, 2007a, p. 315). Contrary to the common belief,
transparency in the area of education corruption in Russia
is of a high level and cases of corruption are reported in the
media (Osipian, 2007b, 2008b).
As follows from the extensive media coverage and
scholarly works, Russian secondary and higher education
suffers from corruption, as do national educational sectors
of other former Soviet republics (see, for instance,
Heyneman, 2004, 2007, 2010; Osipian, 2009a, 2009e;
Round & Rodgers, 2009). The Department of Economic
Security of the Ministry of the Interior in Russia conducted
the annual operation “Education 2008” with the following
results: almost 200 university faculty and administrators13.5
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Fig. 1. Correlation of the GDP per capita growth and estimates of corruption made b
2002.are charged with embezzlement and bribery. There are 217
criminal investigations launched out of 3500 crimes
registered. Of those 3500 crimes almost 600 are bribery
and almost 900 are embezzlement for a total of $3 million
(Nazarets, 2008).
Faculty members are prosecuted and sentenced for
bribery, but often they receive termsonparole or suspended
sentences. They are considered as no threat to the society,
since their crimes are non-violent. One such example is the
case of a faculty member in Perm State Agricultural
Academy, who was sentenced to three years and six month
on parole for bribery. He set a price of $100 for the exami-
nation and managed to collect $2500 in bribes from 25
students in July of 2008. The court also banned this faculty
member from teaching for three years (Ivanova, 2009). In
another example, two faculty members were arrested for
bribery in Oil and Gas University in Tyumen, a large city in
Siberia built around the oil industry. In ﬁrst case it was an
extortion of only $40 in exchange for a positive examination
grade. In the second case it was a sum of $1000 collected
from several students (Leonidov, 2009).
The demand for bribes from the side of educators is
growing, as is the average size of a bribe. According to the
survey, conducted by the Center for Public Opinion
Research in 2004, diminished accessibility to free educa-
tion and medical help is pointed out by 23 percent of
Russians as the greatest problem; 55 percent consider
bureaucracy and corruption among the present political
and economic elite as the major contributing factor that
prevents Russia from getting out of its socio-economic
crisis and achieving economic prosperity (Kofanova &
Petukhov, 2006, p. 24). The increasing gap between pay
rates in private and public sectors of the economy urges
public employees to seek other sources of income
(Gorodnichenko & Sabirianova, 2007). Along with the
health services industry, higher education in Russia has
become one of the industries most affected by corruption.
Surprisingly, 54 percent of Russians believe that harsher
punishment for bribery may stop faculty members from
accepting or extorting bribes (Agranovich, 2008). A rapid
development of higher education, its partial privatization
and the increasing ﬂow of ﬁnancial resources have created
a base for corruption. University faculty members collect
bribes and numerous other illicit beneﬁts and utilize their
privileged position and control over the access to higher
education.25.4
35.1
31.4
40.2
27.6
4.9
27.5
27.8
30 40 50
y the businessmen in the NIS and CEE countries of the former Socialist Bloc,
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comes to corruption. Educators cannot stay outside the
mainstream of development and have to work in rapidly
changing socio-economic conditions. They adjust their
behavior from ethical and professional to opportunistic,
often disregarding codes of conduct in lieu of illicit beneﬁts.
Accordingly, corruption becomes part of the education
sector, as it is of other sectors of the economy and the
government. The evolution of corrupt hierarchies in
universities points to changing internal structures shaped
by external inﬂuences of the market and the government
(Osipian, 2008b). In fact, the ruling political regime in
Russia may be interested in corrupt universities as objects
of blackmail, coercion, and control (Darden, 2008; Osipian,
2010d). The nexus of political graft and education corrup-
tion that may be observed in the former Soviet republics
includes collusion, compliance, and control (Osipian,
2008a). Underpaid educators are more susceptible to
corruption. The regime uses educators’ need for illicit
beneﬁts to create the “feed from the service” scheme and to
control the agenda in universities (Osipian, 2009a). The
regime might be interested in maintaining corruption in
education and preserving its functions of ﬁnancier and
regulator of access to higher education.
Corruption in education is more detrimental to the
society than typical bureaucratic corruption. Corruption in
higher education is detrimental to the society for at least
three major reasons. First, it has a negative impact on the
economy and society due to lowering the system’s efﬁ-
ciency, as does bureaucratic corruption. Second, as distinct
from ordinary bureaucratic corruption, corruption in
higher education reduces the total social welfare of the
society because of its negative effect on the quality of
educational programs and qualiﬁcations of college gradu-
ates. Finally, corruption in education eats away social
cohesion, because students learn not only their subject
matter, but also pervasive ways and practices of corruption.
Corruption in higher education negatively affects access,
quality, and equity. Contrary to expectations, development
of a substantial private sector in higher education in Russia
leads to an increase in corruption. Private universities are as
corrupt as their public counterparts, which prove that not
only public ofﬁcials are susceptible to corruption.
There are around two million licensed positions for
freshmen in around 1500 colleges and universities in Rus-
sia, 80 percent in public colleges and 20 percent in private
ones. In addition, there are numerous public community
colleges and vocational schools. The projections point out
that the number of positions in universities in Russia,
licensed and accredited by the government, is already
higher than the number of candidates willing to pursue
college degrees, including distance learning, correspon-
dence programs, and re-training courses. Almost half of all
the students in public colleges and universities are funded
by the government. Admissions to governmentally funded
positions are corrupt. Course grades can also be bought
from faculty members. The presence of such problems in
the nation’s educational system follows from the numerous
media reports (Osipian, 2008a, 2008b). Corruption affects
all levels of education, from secondary schools and up to
post-graduate studies. Doctoral education is also not free ofcorruption, and doctoral dissertations and degrees are
available for sale (Osipian, 2010a, 2010b, 2011).
Corruption in admissions to governmentally funded
positions in public universities and bribery in the academic
process may be the most explicit, but certainly not the only
forms of corruption in academia. Forms of corruption,
typical for just about any industry, are characteristic of the
education industry as well. Embezzlement of public funds
is committed up the hierarchical ladder, from student
dormitory administrators to heads of colleges and univer-
sities (Novaya gazeta, May 14, 2009). Cases of embezzle-
ment, fraud, gross waste, misallocation of resources, and
other corrupt activities are found in colleges and universi-
ties throughout the country.
Bribery, embezzlement, and fraud are not the only domi-
nating forms of corruption in higher education. Logrolling in
academia is a typical form of latent corruption. Logrolling, as
a form of corruption, may be widespread in Russian univer-
sities. A faculty member in the school of journalism can
guarantee the admission of a protégé from the school of
foreign languages, and the faculty member in the school of
foreign languages can admit his/her protégé inexchange. This
exchange of favors need not be simultaneous. Placement in
a university may be swapped for a job placement. Such an
illicit practice in education can be deﬁned as a corrupt
education swap. Corrupt education swapping is a form of
education corruption that may be more prevalent than
monetary transactions, andmore preferred too, for the safety
reasons.Corrupteducation swappingbelongs to thesectionof
latent corruption. It is oftentimes difﬁcult to identify such
corrupt swaps in universities, and even if identiﬁed, they are
still difﬁcult to prove and to argue as illegal. In economic
sense, however, corrupt education and placement swaps are
no less harmful to the economy and society than education
corruptionwhere bribes are paid in cash.
4. Impact of education corruption on economic
growth
Impact of education corruption on economic growth in
any given nation would normally be measured quantita-
tively. Such measurements would require ﬁnding causality
between the level and dynamics of corruption in the
nation’s secondary and higher education sectors and the
rate of economic growth. So far, there is no direct evidence
that corruption in higher education has a signiﬁcant
negative impact on Russia’s economy or the rate of growth.
Nevertheless, some empirical work that was done in other
regions points in this direction. According to Klitgaard
(1986), elitism and lack of meritocracy in access to higher
education and leadership positions in some developing
countries lead to a decrease in GNP. This work was done for
developing nations, while industrialized nations are nor-
mally not in focus when it comes to correlation between
levels of corruption and economic growth.
Industrialized nations also experience the problem of
education corruption. Thus, new empirical studies are
needed to reﬂect the modern day realities. Only theory and
some comparisons on general developmental trends may
point to disadvantages that a national economy experi-
ences due to a high level corruption in its educational
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presented above, offers a prediction of possible negative
impacts in the long run, when employees with relatively
low levels of formal education will occupy the places of
more capable individuals. However, this lack of formal
education may be partially compensated for by years of
working experience.
Corrupt state ofﬁcials, bureaucrats, and civil servants in
Russia are often perceived as indicating certain forms of
rent-seeking behavior. Rent in this case is extracted from
the monopolistic position based on discretionary powers
possessed and exercised by the bureaucrat. The rent is
extracted in the form of a bribe from the clientele, be it in
a bureaucratic ofﬁce or a university classroom. The rent-
seeking behavior in the Russian society is perceived as
a norm, and higher education sector is no exception in this
sense. Public ofﬁcials, bureaucrats, and civil servants
attempt to transform their right to regulate public access to
material and non-material assets into personal beneﬁts.
Educators act in a similar manner. Each corrupt educator
acts at the level of his/her authority.
The level and scope of opportunistic behavior as well as
the amount of illicit beneﬁts collected depend on formal
authority and informal connections of each individual
educator. Rectors of public universities rent out university
property, including academic and non-academic facilities
and land, to businesses in which they often have a share. In
some colleges, student dormitories may also be rented out
illegally to outsiders. University faculty members collect
their “rent” by selling positive grades on examinations and
homework assignments. By doing so, they de facto sell
academic degrees with no merit. Faculty members collect
their rent by abusing their monopolized function of eval-
uation of academic progress and conferring the degrees.
Unlike in many other societies, the rent-seeking
behavior in Russia extends far beyond state bureaucracy,
public healthcare and education sectors. The public sector
is not the only area of rent extraction by the bureaucrats
and civil servants. The entire national economy suffers from
a heavy dependency on rent extraction from the rich
natural resources. With a signiﬁcant and continuing
increase in prices on oil, gas and other resources, Russians
consider rent-seeking not only as a form of bureaucratic
behavior, but also as the way the national economy works.
This makes the very idea of living of rent a norm,
a conceptual base for a new way of thinking.
Education corruption and growth may be linked
through human capital, and mechanisms of human capital
valuation under different conditions. The transition from
the Soviet to post-Soviet reality touches on the higher
education sector. During the Soviet era, the major stake for
individuals was gaining higher education. On the one hand,
the access to higher education was restricted and the
admissions were competitive. On the other hand, all
students were fully funded by the state and in addition
received stipends and free dormitory accommodations.
Jobs were available for everyone, and higher educationwas
not a “must” for those seeking placement. There was no
unemployment in the country and in fact people were not
allowed to be unemployed. Idle people could face criminal
persecution under the anti-idleness law.The state regulated the access to higher education not
only directly, through admissions rules and entry exami-
nations, but indirectly as well. There were some disincen-
tives embedded in the system of education and
employment that worked as regulators or stabilizers: low
salaries for educated people kept many away from
universities and lowered the demand for higher education.
The state monopoly on all the sectors of the economy
meant that wages were set by the government. As a result
of low wages for educated professionals, many engineers
worked as skilled workers and earned twice as much, plus
had better beneﬁts, including faster process of obtaining
housing and shorter waiting term for purchasing cars. The
state determined the salaries and beneﬁts for all categories
of employees. There was no labor market, in its classical
understanding, in the country.
In distinction of the Soviet era, the major stake in
contemporary Russia is no longer a college degree, but the
job. More and more often, education becomes a necessary
formality, such as a diploma to occupy a certain job posi-
tion, and can be bought. Corruption in higher education
allows for circumventing formal requirements for gaining
a degree. This situation may change only in one case: if
a growing competition between ﬁrms will make the need
for higher economic effectiveness stronger, and employers
will start seeking skilled professionals more actively. In the
current situation, the existing level of nepotism, cronyism,
preferential treatment, and sometimes outright bribery
dictate, in part, employment decisions. Such practices
result in an undeveloped labor market. In many instances,
high level human capital is undervalued and its bearers, i.e.
highly skilled andmotivated professionals, are underpriced
or artiﬁcially made low-competitive. Large companies
proﬁt from their size and monopolistic position in certain
segments of the market instead of relying on better
professionals and better organization of labor. As a result,
there is a paradox of shortage of highly qualiﬁed profes-
sionals and low pay rates for such professionals. On one
hand, competing ﬁrms and the technological processes in
each ﬁrm require capable high skilled professionals. On the
other hand, ﬁrms only rarely compete for such profes-
sionals and do not offer them competitive pay rates,
commensurate with their experience and value to the
company. Meritocracy and talent suffer, while low profes-
sionalism gains way.
Russian mass education offers plenty of average quality,
affordable, and accessible higher education. However, in
addition to honest ways, one can obtain diplomas in
exchange for bribes. With broader introduction of for-
tuition programs, when payments for education are made
legally, corruption in admissions will inevitably decline.
Such a decline will not mean the surrender of corrupted
educators and eradication of corruption in education insti-
tutions. Corruption is not limited to admissions to govern-
mentally funded positions, but continues in the academic
process through the program of study. Students in for-
tuition programs also seek easy ways to pass examina-
tions and faculty members often demonstrate willingness
to help students to continue their studies even though their
academic performance is below any lax standards, let alone
standards established by the state accreditation bodies.
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further development of the labor market, when knowledge
obtained in universities, whether funded by the govern-
ment or paid for by tuition, will be valued higher than
personal connections, bribes, and other illicit beneﬁts.
Russia declares modernization as a major way for its
development. Revenues that come from the increasing
export of natural resources can form a monetary base for
this widely acclaimed modernization, but it should also
have the human capital component. Unfortunately, so far
Russian higher education sector has failed to provide the
national economy with high quality graduates and the
national economy has failed to build up a structure of
economic incentives that would encourage employment of
such college graduates. As a result, a weak undeveloped
labor market pulls back the nation’s otherwise dynamically
developing economy.
In the post-transition market economy, massive reno-
vation of plants, factories, and transport and communica-
tion infrastructure is much needed. This renovation
requires investment in both principal capital and human
capital. The modernizing economy needs professionals
who would be able to invent and use new technologies,
operate the machines, and manage complex technological
processes. It is misleading to assume that during the Soviet
era, there were plenty of highly skilled professionals
starting in the 1970s. Nevertheless, this assumption was
still being made as a result of high unemployment, espe-
cially among technical cadres, during the 1990s. As
a consequence, the major focus in Russia now is on the
future investment in principal capital, includingmachinery,
equipment, and technologies. These elements of principal
capital are often imported from abroad. However, human
capital is becoming a limited resource, with qualiﬁed
specialists being in short supply.
The process of economic transformation from planned
to market economy is characterized by the transition from
full employment to unemployment. In the Soviet era, the
planned economy employed the entire available workforce.
The predominantly extensive nature of economic growth
explained full employment at that period. In the market
economies, full employment is rather a continuing goal to
be achieved than a reality. Accordingly, market reforms of
the 1990s and a decline in production led to economic
restructuring and high unemployment. Over the last
decade the Russian economy has indicated average to high
rates of growth. The unemployment level has declined
signiﬁcantly. However, the illicit ways and corrupt practices
of gaining and retaining employment remain virtually
intact.
Illicit ways to receive jobs include nepotism, cronyism,
personal connections, and bribes. They are similar to the
illicit forms of gaining access to publicly funded higher
education. There are two consequences of such realities.
First, a signiﬁcant portion of human capital is of unclear
value. Second, the high quality human capital is often
undervalued and not utilized in societal production at full
capacity. Distribution of property rights on production
capacities, including plants and mines, is skewed and
concentrated in the hands of a few. This uneven distribu-
tion is a result of corrupt privatization of public enterprisesin the 1990s. Such distribution is especially important
because the Russian economy remains industry oriented,
rather than predominantly service oriented. This might be
a better structure for the national economy. However, low
competition between the producers means no need for the
best and brightest. Unequal distribution of property rights
on production capacities eventually results in undervalued
human capital.
Even competition between the employers does not
place the real value and the accent on human capital.
Employers often seek a diploma holder who can do the job
for the lowest possible wage, rather than a high skilled
professional. The diploma is needed as a part of the risk
aversion strategy of the employers, typical for the job
market. It may also be needed in order to satisfy some
formal requirements. The result is that employees cannot
do the job properly. They are ineffective. Employers no
longer rely on diplomas; in addition to degree certiﬁcates of
prospective employees, they prefer working experience as
a guarantee of qualiﬁcations. Preferential treatment in
higher education and employment may correlate posi-
tively. Those with means to buy places in prestigious public
universities are likely to obtain better job placements by
the samemethod of bribing and using kinship and personal
connection.
The property rights on the principal capital, including
plants and factories, are in the hands of a few. These few
proﬁt on the size of the enterprise rather than on its
effective organization and high level of productivity. They
do not need to push for the highest effectiveness and efﬁ-
ciency possible. They accumulate large proﬁts thanks to
their size, not to the effectiveness of their work, and can
afford lavish lifestyle. The initial monopolistic structure of
the economy inherited from the Soviet era, emphasis on
machine-building and heavy industry, and poorly designed
and implemented privatization resulted in the high degree
of monopolization and low competition. A weak need for
competitiveness, as well as the strong tradition of non-
economic solutions for economic problems, including
through maﬁa and illicit business–government relations,
lead to low effectiveness and efﬁciency.
5. Policy recommendations
Russia continues to undergo the process of massiﬁcation
of higher education. More youth and mid-career profes-
sionals turn to higher education institutions. The process of
massiﬁcation of higher education is driven by two funda-
mentals: development of production and social develop-
ment (Dye, 1966; Lindeen &Willis, 1975; Volkwein &Malik,
1997). Firms present demand for the skilled labor,
produced in the higher education sector (Marshall &
Tucker, 1992). The Russian government represents inter-
ests of producers and so its function is to supply skilled
labor to ﬁrms by maintaining the system of public educa-
tion. The economy requires human capital at a minimum
cost. Hence, the task of the government is to maximize the
effectiveness and efﬁciency of public higher education. It
may be done on the basis of threemajor blocs of the reform.
The ﬁrst bloc includes decentralization dismantling of the
vertical axis of subordination to the state. The second bloc
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education. Finally, the third bloc anticipates achieving the
new balance between university autonomy and level of its
accountability to the government. This new balance can
only be achieved through further restructuring, privatiza-
tion, plurality of forms of property and economic activities.
We suggest continuing market reforms and lessening
governmental control in the Russian higher education
sector.
The task of drastically reducing corruption in the
education sector is of a paramount importance. The Russian
government makes continuous efforts to curb corruption in
education. However, little can be done to reduce education
corruption in the short run. The measures that target
corruption on the functional level, such as an increase in
the level of transparency and introduction of the code of
conduct for faculty, students, and administrators, are not
enough. Structural changes, organizational changes, and
institutional changes are needed to resist corruption in
education. These changes may be implemented from the
top, but only to a limited extent. Structural, organizational,
and institutional changes will still be insufﬁcient to oppose
corruption. The real structure of corrupt relations in
academia is much more complex and often involves rigid
hierarchical structures (Osipian, 2009d, 2010c). Funda-
mental changes are needed. Such changes can only evolve
naturally, based on technological changes and demands for
societal production.
In Russia, entry examinations for prospective students
are sometimes taken by well-prepared students from other
universities. Such impersonations are illegal, but there are
ways of avoiding prosecution for such misconduct. The
standardized test attempts to reduce impersonations on
entry examinations, but the recent investigations show
that it is not quite successful in this endeavor (LifeNews,
June 15, 2011; Newsru.com, June 14, 2011). In addition,
the system of academic Olympiads developed and widened
signiﬁcantly as an alternative to the test now becomes
rotten with impersonators. Osipian (2009b) reports that
the standardized test experiences numerous problems and
is unlikely to solve the problem of corruption in higher
education even at the entrance stage. Test-based admis-
sions are admissions to universities on a competitive basis,
based on the results of independently administered
computer graded examinations or standardized tests.
These are anticipated to become a major tool in ﬁghting
corruption in admissions.
The beneﬁt of introducing the standardized tests in ﬁght
with corruption in admissions to publically funded higher
education institutions remains arguable. Few years ago,
Russian media presented reports on the standardized
testing as a tool to curb education corruption; now it
reports corruption in standardized testing itself. Even if
proven successful in reducing corruption in access to
higher education, the standardized national testing does
not represent fundamental changes in the education sector.
The test-based admissions as replacement for the
university-based entry examinations means preservation
of the same system when the government retains the
distribution function. Under such a system, corruption is
unlikely to decline, even in the long run. In addition, theearlier initiative with educational vouchers as replacement
for the direct governmental funding of higher education
institutions has failed. In order to remove the government
as an intermediary and the distributor, direct governmental
funding should be replaced almost entirely with direct
consumer payments. Income-based inequality in access to
higher education should be compensated for with educa-
tional loans. Educational loans should come as a combina-
tion of governmental student loans and private bank
credits.
The reform of education ﬁnancing alone will not result
in the change of the system. The reform should include
measures for further privatization of colleges and univer-
sities. Privatization of public universities should include
privatization of land on which they stand. This type of
privatization will allow universities to raise funds for
investment in university facilities, equipment, and libraries.
In addition, it will allow a much needed increase in faculty
salaries, establishment of scholarships for most promising
students with low income, and expanding research capa-
bilities. While the issue of property rights delineation is
fundamental, the tests are also important for successful
reforms (Osipian, 2008c, p. 101). Decentralized educational
systems with a large private sector are not entirely free
from corruption, but they may better ﬁt modern Russia.
6. Conclusion
As can be seen from the discussion, high levels of
education corruption may harm total factor productivity in
the long run, primarily through lowering the level of
human capital and slowing the pace of its accumulation.
Ethical standards learned in the process of training in
universities can also affect the standards of practice in
different professions. The growing level of productivity is
not likely to reduce education corruption in the short run,
but can eventually lead to implementation of higher ethical
standards in the education sector. This may happen
through the chain of incentives emerging at every stage of
the process of creation and utilization of human capital. To
simplify, the growing complexity of technological
processes will demand higher amounts of human capital,
including human capital per capita. This will change the
characteristics of the labor force in demand. The labor
market will send the signal to the education sector and to
future employees. As a result, both producers of educa-
tional services and those investing in their human capital
will demand high quality education rather than bribe their
way to educational certiﬁcates.
It is unlikely that education corruption deﬁnes or
inﬂuences the structure of the Russian economy. Such
explicit manifestations of corruption in the higher educa-
tion sector as diploma mills are presented in the form of
distant branches of colleges and universities. Their total
revenue is insigniﬁcant, as are their enrollments, and they
do not occupy a signiﬁcant niche in the sector. Changes in
the structure of the national economy can reduce corrup-
tion in higher education due to the demand on qualiﬁed
work force and competitiveness of ﬁrms. An increase in
competition due to the decreasing concentration of prop-
erty rights andmore even distribution of property rights on
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over governmentally supported educational certiﬁcates.
Decentralization and restructuring of the Russian higher
education sector diminish the role of the government.
University autonomy may be needed to replace weakening
governmental control. Meritocracy and high social prestige
of academic profession and university degrees slowly
weaken. This indicates the process of erosion of values,
common for the transition society overall. The value of
forgeries will eventually be annihilated by their over-
whelming number. If the situation will develop in an
unregulated, unorganized way, the university degree will
become absurdist. Reputation of each degree and degree
holder will be based on his/her academic merits and
reputation of the granting university. The competitive labor
market will accent the values of academic degrees and
human capital.References
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